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Peter Balint identifies three challenges to toleration, one of which is the multiculturalism challenge. 
This is the charge that liberal toleration fails to accommodate minorities adequately, which requires 
positive recognition rather than negative toleration. I discuss his response to the multiculturalism 
challenge and its connection to a classical liberal view of toleration. This involves Balint’s claim 
that liberal neutrality should be understood as reflective and ‘difference-sensitive’, which should be 
realised by the state being ‘handsoff’ in the sense of withdrawing support for privileged ways of 
life. I argue that Balint’s classical liberal view that the state needs to be ‘hands-off’ is in need of 
specification and that it does not fit well with his claim that neutrality needs to be reflective and 
difference-sensitive. 
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An important contribution of Peter Balint’s theory of toleration is his identification of several long-
standing but undertheoried themes in debates about toleration: The multiculturalism challenge, that 
liberalism fails to accommodate minorities adequately, which requires positive recognition. The 
despotism challenge, according to which toleration is in itself objectionable since it involves one 
agent having power over another. And the neutrality challenge, claiming that a neutral state cannot 
be tolerant, since toleration presupposes objection which is ruled out by neutrality (pp. 3-4). I will 
focus on his response to the multiculturalism challenge and its connection to a classical liberal view 
of toleration. 
The multiculturalism challenge alleges that traditional liberalism has failed to accommodate 
minorities adequately, and that fair accommodation requires some sort of positive respect or 
recognition of minority practices, ways of life, or identities (p. 3). There is a negative and a positive 
part to the challenge. The negative part targets traditional liberalism. The positive part of the 
challenge postulates a need to go ‘beyond’ traditional toleration. This is indeed a quite widespread 
assumption in many theories of multiculturalism (Lægaard, 2013a, pp. 53-54). 
Balint responds to the multiculturalism challenge that liberalism is also about accommodation and 
that it can accommodate minorities more adequately than many proposed forms of multiculturalism 
supposedly going beyond toleration. Balint presents toleration as a way of securing accommodation, 
by which he means that ‘someone is relatively free to do the thing they want to do/be, and [that] any 
political or social restriction is properly justified.’ (p. 8) Accommodation spans several different 
ways of relating to differences, including both classical forbearance tolerance, indifference (usually 
discussed under the heading of neutrality), and notions of respect for difference often linked to 
multicultural ideas about positive recognition (pp. 31-32). Furthermore, ‘toleration is primarily 
justified through negative freedom, and toleration is valuable to the extent that this type of freedom 
is valuable.’ (p. 7) He then argues that neutrality is superior to respect for difference as a way of 
accommodating minorities and that the best way of securing state neutrality is for the state to adopt 
a ‘hands off’ approach. His position is thus a classical liberal one at two levels: It assumes 
individual freedom to be the fundamental value justifying toleration and it takes less state 
involvement to be the best policy to secure this value. 
Balint focuses on neutrality of intent relative to ways of life as a derivative value based on other 
values. He points out that neutrality is an ideal (p. 54) and a range concept (p. 57). This means that 
it is not an objection to neutrality that states cannot be perfectly neutral. Neutrality is only supposed 
to hold relative to ways of life within a given permissible range and is an aspiration, towards which 
states should strive even if they cannot attain it completely. 
Balint’s first point is that we should understand neutrality in a ‘reflective’ and ‘difference-sensitive’ 
way. We cannot achieve neutrality once and for all. Because neutrality is about intentionally not 
favouring specific ways of life over others, a policy that manages to be neutral at time t might be 
non-neutral at time t+1 because new ways of life have appeared (p. 55, p. 61). This important 
insight goes some way towards answering the multiculturalism challenge. The challenge is partly 
motivated by all too common cases where norms, rules and institutions designed to be neutral 
regarding established forms of difference are preserved even though they disadvantage newly 
recognized or groups of recent arrivals and their descendants. The multiculturalism challenge is 
often a correct criticism of the status quo. Balint is correct that this does not show a problem with 
the liberal ideals invoked as rationales for the status quo; it merely shows that majorities often fail 
to honour these ideals when it comes to newly recognized or immigrant groups. We can understand 
much multicultural criticism of the status quo as expressions of liberal concerns with neutrality 
understood in Balint’s reflective sense.  
A plausible conception of neutrality indeed has to be reflective and ‘difference-sensitive’ in Balint’s 
sense. Difference-sensitivity is not a distinct normative commitment requiring positive appreciation 
of specific differences in addition to standard liberal principles (Lægaard 2013b). It is rather about 
sensitivity to how the range of differences relative to which the state should be neutral may change, 
which is important precisely in order to make sure the state continually lives up to liberal principles 
(p. 62). We should think of multiculturalism as a re-interpretation of existing liberal values under 
changing empirical circumstances (Lægaard 2017). 
Balint’s next claim is that difference-sensitive neutrality ‘is consistent with two forms of liberalism; 
that of recognition and an active state and that of withdrawal and a smaller state.’ It ‘can be realized 
by the state either withdrawing support for privileged ways of life (being ‘hands off’) or 
maintaining this support and extending the privilege to the previously excluded (being ‘hands on’).’ 
(p. 64) 
This distinction is in need of specification since it is not clear what counts as hands on and as hands 
off policies.  
Balint’s first formulation invokes an incongruent distinction between an active state and a smaller 
state. This conflates two distinctions, one between active and passive, and another between larger 
and smaller. A small state can be active and a large state can be passive, so the two distinctions do 
not map on to each other. 
If we understand Balint’s distinction as one between active and passive, the state is ‘hands on’ when 
it does something and ‘hands off’ when it does nothing. This way of understanding the distinction 
requires a standard of comparison: is it hands off to leave the status quo in place?  
Balint’s own argument about difference-sensitive neutrality implies that, when empirical 
circumstances change so that its policies are no longer neutral, the state should revise those policies. 
So preserving neutrality requires doing something. Being hands off accordingly cannot simply 
mean that the state does nothing. 
Take the example of the individual freedom to wear religious dress like the Muslim headscarf. In a 
context where Muslims are relative newcomers, say in a traditionally protestant country, freedom of 
religion might be understood as merely protecting freedom of conscience and the freedom of 
association required to gather for worship. In such a society, there might be many rules in place 
preventing individuals from wearing a headscarf, simply because this is not a traditional form of 
dress. To secure neutrality, the state should adjust the understanding of religious freedom to also 
include the manifestation of religious belief through religious dress and revise the rules preventing 
headscarves accordingly (unless other reasons trump considerations of freedom of religion). This 
requires active intervention on the part of the state. 
The other distinction between smaller and larger is not clear either. In the present context, the 
relevant understanding is not about the size of the state budget or number of state employees. A 
more relevant understanding might turn on the degree of state interference, which would make the 
state hands on when it interferes and hands off when it does not interfere. This is not necessarily the 
same as the active/passive distinction, since state activity can be non-interfering, e.g. if the state 
provides facilities or active support. State passivity can arguably also be interfering, e.g. if the state 
refrains from removing previously established structures preventing people from doing what they 
want.  
In the headscarf example, the state might itself be interfering if it prohibits headscarves. The state 
would then be more hands off if it removed such prohibitions and thereby interfered less. However, 
the state is rarely the only agent preventing individuals from wearing headscarves. Many private 
employers might impose dress requirements with this effect. If the state has revised its 
understanding of freedom of religion to include freedom to manifest religious belief through 
religious dress, some private dress requirements are likely to violate freedom of religion thus 
understood (again, provided no other considerations outweigh this concern). Given state 
commitment to protecting religious freedom, the state then seems required to interfere and compel 
private employers to revise their dress requirements. It is accordingly problematic to understand 
being hands off as non-interference, if hands off is to secure difference-sensitive neutrality. 
Balint’s explanation in terms of ‘support’ to and ‘privilege’ of ways of life suggest a third way of 
understanding the distinction, which is not equivalent to the others since a state can be active and 
interfere without thereby intending to support or privilege specific ways of life. States do many 
things, which seem very much ‘hands on’, that do not take the form of support or privilege.  
In the headscarf example, a liberal state committed to non-discrimination and freedom of religion 
will be both active and interfering. Nevertheless, the aim will not be to support or privilege any 
particular way of life. An illiberal state bent on privileging an established majority culture, on the 
other hand, can support it merely by refraining from instituting non-discrimination rules. 
So the distinction between ‘hands on’ and ‘hands off’ policies is not sufficiently clear and allows 
different readings. Several of the immediate readings furthermore suggest counterexamples to 
Balint’s next main claim, namely that hands off approaches are preferable to hands on approaches 
as ways of securing neutrality.  
He justifies this claim in two ways. One justification simply consists in the claim that hands off 
approaches offer more freedom to individuals (p. 67). His example of hands off policies offering 
more individual freedom simply concerns an absence of prohibitions, so the more a state permits, 
the more hands off it is.  
This secures individual freedom in the sense that the state does then not prevent individuals from 
doing a specific thing. However, this assumes a negative conception of freedom as well as an agent-
relative perspective from the point of view of the state. While individuals are freer from state 
interference if the state does not prohibit something they might want to do compared to a situation 
where the state does prohibit the thing in question, this does not guarantee that they are free from 
interference to do the thing. Other agents might prevent them from doing what they want to do. In 
such situations, a hands off approach will not offer more freedom to individuals, all things 
considered, even on a purely negative conception of freedom, and will arguably not qualify as 
neutral, if the state knows about the interference from other agents. State interference, e.g. in the 
form of rights protection or enforcement of non-discrimination, is then necessary to secure 
individual freedom. So once again, an active and meddling state might be required to achieve the 
aims to which Balint appeals. 
However, Balint’s ‘primary reason’ for hands off rather than hands on neutrality is rather based on 
‘a view of what the state can and should do, given its limitations.’ (p. 68) States both lack the 
knowledge and ability to change required to actually achieve neutrality by way of hands on policies.  
This is an important insight analogous to classical liberal ideas about the lack of state ability to plan 
the economy and arguments that a free market is a better source of information about people’s 
actual preferences than any centralised government agency could ever be. However, this second 
argument for hands off approaches is a non-ideal argument, since it refers to practical limitations. 
The argument therefore faces the same kind of response Balint gives to the feasibility objection to 
neutrality, namely that neutrality is an ideal and a range-property. One might therefore acknowledge 
Balint’s claims about the limits of state knowledge and ability and the resultant likelihood that 
states cannot secure neutrality by hands on means, but still argue that it should be as hands on as 
possible, within the limits of feasibility. Just as the state should try to be as neutral as possible 
within the relevant range, the state should perhaps be as hands on as possible in the cases most 
central for securing individual freedom or in which we are confident beyond reasonable doubt that a 
hands on policy will actually take us towards neutrality?  
Balint actually allows for such a scenario in cases where it is not politically feasible to reverse some 
areas of favouritism: ‘support should [then] be reduced as much as is feasible in order to come 
closer to the ideal of neutrality. Failing this, there may be occasions where taking a more ‘hands on’ 
approach is the right thing to do.’ (p. 74) State recognition and support for religious communities 
might be an example. If a majority wants to retain its religious privileges, the complete separation 
and disestablishment required by liberal neutrality might not be feasible. This raises problems of the 
second best. If the political obstacles are unyielding, the right thing may not be to go for the option 
in the feasible set closest to the ideal of complete state indifference. If feasibility constraints are due 
to majority resistance to disestablishment, it might still be feasible to remove secondary forms of 
state recognition and support for minority religions. This would take the state closer to the ideal of 
neutrality where the state recognises no religions. However, it would at the same time increase 
religious inequality.  
In such a situation, multi-faith establishment of some sort seems better than partial 
disestablishment. Balint actually acknowledges something similar in the case of marriage. If it is not 
feasible to remove state support for heterosexual marriage, then homosexual marriage should be 
recognized by the state. While this would be less neutral than removing support altogether, Balint 
says that it is ‘more neutral than only supporting heterosexual marriage, and is thus to be preferred.’ 
(p. 74) But this implies that neutrality is not only about indifference, but about equality, insofar as 
full indifference is not politically feasible. 
Balint’s acceptance that equal support would be more neutral than only support for one way of life 
shows the importance of the comparative aspect of neutrality. Neutrality is just as much a matter of 
equality as of individual freedom; non-favouritism and hands off policy is only desirable if 
extended equally. The value of neutrality is only realized when the state is indifferent towards a 
whole range of ways of life, not if it is only indifferent towards some of them. Even though the state 
then does less – it favours fewer ways of life – it is less neutral in the sense that matters. Therefore, 
the claim that a hands off approach is preferable seems false.  
Therefore, while I agree with much of Balint’s response to the multiculturalism challenge, his 
claims that toleration is primarily about individual negative freedom and that a hands off approach 
is the best way to secure difference-sensitive neutrality seem questionable. Balint is right that liberal 
values underlie the plausible part of the multiculturalism challenge, but I disagree with his classical 
liberal reading of this claim according to which the primary liberal value is individual negative 
freedom and the best policy is hands off. 
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